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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
Judge Thomas Doerr appeals an order of the District 
Court denying him qualified immunity on civil rights claims 
brought by Plaintiff Crystal Starnes. Starnes contends we lack 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal, but we disagree. As for the 
merits, we agree with Starnes, except for her First Amendment 
freedom of association claim. So we will affirm in part, reverse 
in part, and remand the case for further proceedings.  
I 
Because Doerr appeals an order denying his motion to 
dismiss under Rule 12(b), we must accept Starnes’s well-
pleaded allegations as true, construe them in the light most 
favorable to her, and draw all reasonable inferences in her 
favor. SEC v. Gentile, 939 F.3d 549, 552 n.1 (3d Cir. 2019). 
We present the facts subject to those principles. 
A 
In 2004, Starnes met Doerr at a Christmas party held by 
the Chief Public Defender for Butler County, Pennsylvania. At 
the time, Starnes was a Probation Officer in Allegheny County, 
and Doerr was the President Judge of the Butler County Court 
of Common Pleas. Doerr flirted with Starnes at the party, they 




 Following the party, Doerr repeatedly called Starnes to 
ask her to “meet him at his chambers.” Starnes v. Court of 
Common Pleas of Butler Cty. (Starnes I), 2018 WL 3586835, 
at *1 (W.D. Pa. 2018). Starnes initially declined Doerr’s 
invitations, but in early 2005 she relented and visited his 
chambers after hours. When she arrived, Doerr began kissing 
her and insisted she have sex with him. Starnes did so even 
though Doerr’s advances were not welcome. Earlier that 
evening, Doerr had discussed the prospect of hiring Starnes as 
a probation officer in Butler County. Doerr later told Starnes 
that “their sexual interactions would be a ‘business 
relationship.’” Id.  
In the summer of 2005, a job became available in the 
Butler County Probation Office. Doerr, in his capacity as 
President Judge, exercised supervisory authority over the 
hiring of probation officers. Starnes wished to return to Butler, 
her hometown, and Doerr made sure she was hired. After 
Starnes started working in Butler County, Doerr began 
summoning her to his chambers and cajoling her into sexual 
relations. He also shared pornography with Starnes and 
discussed sex on the telephone with her. This situation 
continued for four years. 
After their sexual relations ended in 2009, Doerr 
continued to try to influence Starnes by asking her to film 
herself performing sexual acts, flirting with her from his 
position on the bench, holding her “hand while explaining that 
he could help her return to her previous job,” and interrupting 
her when she spoke to male staff. Id. at *1–2. In 2010, Starnes 
began dating the man she later married, who was also a 
Probation Officer in Butler County. He was harassed and 
pushed into retirement by Butler County administrators.  
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In 2014, Doerr transferred Starnes to the Butler County 
Domestic Relations Office at her request. Starnes regretted her 
decision and asked to return to the Probation Office, which she 
was entitled to do within 30 days. At first, Doerr did not allow 
her to return. Thomas Holman, the Deputy Court 
Administrator, told Starnes that “[t]he marriage was over” and 
she would “have to sue Doerr” to get her previous job back. Id. 
at *2, 8. Doerr eventually allowed Starnes to return, but only if 
she signed a general release waiving all claims against the 
Butler County Court of Common Pleas.  
When Starnes returned to the Probation Office, she was 
denied her own office, overtime, training opportunities, and the 
right to serve on-call duty—opportunities she alleges her male 
counterparts had. She also was isolated from other officers and 
was not allowed to supervise other probation officers in the 
field. And whenever she visited probationers, Doerr assigned 
two male partners to accompany her because he believed it was 
too dangerous.  
Because Starnes suspected discrimination, she 
contacted the United States Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) in February 2016 intending to file 
charges. Within days of telling her supervisors (including 
Doerr and Holman) of her intentions, Starnes was placed on a 
“performance improvement plan” and she was told Doerr and 
Holman were behind the move. One month prior to that, 
Starnes had received a positive evaluation with no noted 
performance issues.  
B 
After the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter, Starnes filed 
a five-count complaint (as Jane Doe) in the District Court 
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against Doerr, Holman, and the Butler County Court of 
Common Pleas. Count I alleged a Title VII hostile work 
environment claim against the County. Count II alleged that 
Doerr violated her First Amendment rights by forcing her to 
associate with him in an intimate fashion. Count III alleged a 
violation of her Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights 
by discriminating against her on the basis of sex. Count IV 
alleged Doerr and Holman retaliated against her for exercising 
her First Amendment rights. Count V alleged Doerr and 
Holman violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to due 
process. After the District Court ordered her to do so, Starnes 
identified herself in an amended complaint.  
Starnes later filed a second amended complaint, 
alleging the same five counts. Doerr moved to dismiss the 
claims against him (Counts II-V) for several reasons, including 
qualified immunity.1   
On July 26, 2018, the District Court granted the motion 
in part and denied it in part. It dismissed Starnes’s equal 
protection claim (Count III) without prejudice with leave to 
amend and dismissed her procedural due process claim (Count 
V) with prejudice. It denied Doerr’s motion on all other 
grounds and rejected his qualified immunity defense.  
As the Court gave Starnes a final chance to amend the 
equal protection claim, she filed a third amended complaint.  
Doerr again moved to dismiss, incorporating arguments from 
 
1 Holman and the Butler County Court also filed a 
motion to dismiss, which the District Court denied in its July 
26 order. They are not parties to this appeal. 
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his previous motion to dismiss and reiterating his qualified 
immunity defense.  
On October 4, 2018, the District Court denied the 
motion, holding that Starnes sufficiently alleged that Doerr 
discriminated against her because of sex. Starnes v. Court of 
Common Pleas of Butler Cty., 2018 WL 4828515, at *1 (W.D. 
Pa 2018) (Starnes II). The District Court did not discuss other 
issues addressed in the opinion on the prior motion to dismiss, 
except to note that Doerr misunderstood the decision on the 
freedom of association claim (Count II) and that his “renewed 
immunity arguments” were “improperly raised and legally 
unsound.” Id. at *1 n. 2.  
Doerr appealed to our Court. Starnes moved to dismiss 
Doerr’s appeal as untimely, claiming the July 26 order was not 
appealed within thirty days, as required by the Federal Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, and the October 4 order was an 
unappealable interlocutory order. A motions panel of this 
Court referred Starnes’s motion to dismiss the appeal to the 
merits panel, so we address it now. 
II 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. The “collateral order doctrine” 
gives us jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review certain 
interlocutory orders. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 
337 U.S. 541, 545 (1949). An order denying a defendant 
qualified immunity can constitute such an order. Mitchell v. 
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526–27 (1985). An appeal must be filed 
within thirty days after entry of the order or judgment appealed 
from. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a). Our review is plenary. See Bistrian 
v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 364 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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Starnes argues we lack jurisdiction because Doerr failed 
to timely appeal the July 26 order that “conclusively 
determined” the qualified immunity issue. Starnes Br. 1–2 
(citing FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)). In order to be appealable, 
collateral orders must “conclusively determine” an issue, 
meaning the resolution of the issue must be “complete, formal, 
and . . . final.” Harris v. Kellogg Brown & Root Serv’s, Inc., 
618 F.3d 398, 401 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Orders 
denying qualified immunity ordinarily are conclusive in one of 
two ways: (1) either “there will be nothing in the subsequent 
course of the proceedings in the district court that can alter the 
court’s conclusion that the defendant is not immune”; or 
(2) “the court’s denial . . . finally and conclusively determines 
the defendant’s claim of right not to stand trial [or undergo 
“the burdens of broad-reaching discovery”] on the plaintiff’s 
allegations.” Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526–527. In either case, 
“Cohen’s threshold requirement of a fully consummated 
decision is satisfied.” Id. (quoting Abney v. United States, 431 
U.S. 651, 659 (1977)).  
The Court’s October 4 order denying qualified 
immunity fits into the second category. It finally and 
conclusively subjects Doerr to the burdens of discovery and 
involved purely legal questions. It is therefore a final decision 
for purposes of the collateral order doctrine. See Vanderklok v. 
United States, 868 F.3d 189, 196–97 (3d Cir. 2017). So for 
Starnes to prevail on her jurisdictional argument, we would 
have to find that Doerr’s failure to appeal the District Court’s 
July 26 order denying qualified immunity and granting Starnes 
leave to file an amended complaint precluded him from 
challenging that denial of qualified immunity on appeal from 
subsequent orders that denied him qualified immunity. We 
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discern no reason why the July 26 order should have such 
preclusive effect.   
In its July 26 order, the District Court decided the 
qualified immunity issue for most of Starnes’s claims, but it 
granted her leave to amend. Had Starnes chosen to stand on her 
second amended complaint, the District Court’s order certainly 
would have become an appealable interlocutory order. See In 
re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 705 (3d Cir. 1996).2 
But she filed a third amended complaint, and Doerr asserted 
qualified immunity by incorporating arguments he had made 
in his prior motion. The District Court then issued the October 
4 order, which conclusively determined that litigation would 
proceed as to the amended claim as well as those addressed in 
July. Doerr then timely appealed that final, appealable 
interlocutory order in accordance with Rule 4(a).   
In a previous decision, we explained that the Rule 4(a) 
deadline “applies to ‘all appealable orders, including collateral 
orders, specifically orders denying immunity.’” In re 
Montgomery County, 215 F.3d 367, 372 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(quoting Weir v. Propst, 915 F.2d 283, 286 (7th Cir. 1990)). 
There, we quoted approvingly the Seventh Circuit’s statement 
that if “the deadline [to appeal an interlocutory order] is 
missed, th[at] order is not appealable. The defendant must then 
wait until another appealable order . . . is entered, upon appeal 
of which he can challenge any interlocutory order that has not 
become moot.” Id. (internal citation omitted). Doerr did just 
 
2 We need not, and do not, decide whether an order 
denying qualified immunity but granting narrow leave to 
amend, like the July order here, can ever be immediately 




that, “wait[ing] until another appealable order [on October 4 
was] entered.” Id. The qualified immunity issue was not moot 
and Doerr appealed the October 4 order well before the 30 days 
expired.  
 Finally, “the historic federal policy against piecemeal 
appeals” also supports our holding. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. 
Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 438 (1956). As the Supreme Court has 
explained: 
From the very foundation of our judicial system 
the object and policy of the acts of congress in 
relation to appeals and writs of error . . . have 
been to save the expense and delays of repeated 
appeals in the same suit, and to have the whole 
case and every matter in controversy in it decided 
in a single appeal. 
McLish v. Roff, 141 U.S. 661, 665–66 (1891). On Starnes’s 
view, Doerr would have to appeal each order of the District 
Court denying qualified immunity. Forcing him to file two or 
more separate appeals on the qualified immunity issue at the 
pleadings stage would contravene our duty to “protect the 
integrity of the congressional policy against piecemeal 
appeals.” Switz. Cheese Ass’n v. E. Horne’s Mkt. Inc., 385 U.S. 
23, 25 (1966). Accordingly, we hold that Doerr’s appeal is 
timely and we have jurisdiction under § 1291. 
III 
Having established our jurisdiction to hear this appeal, 
we turn to the merits of Doerr’s qualified immunity defense. 
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“In considering whether qualified immunity attaches, 
courts perform a two-pronged analysis to determine: (1) 
‘whether the facts that [the] plaintiff has alleged . . . make out 
a violation of a constitutional right,’ and (2) ‘whether the right 
at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of [the] 
defendant’s alleged misconduct.’” Kedra v. Schroeter, 876 
F.3d 424, 434 (3d Cir. 2017) (alterations in original) (quoting 
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). 
For a constitutional right to be clearly established, “[t]he 
contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable 
official would understand that what he is doing violates that 
right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). We 
ask if the case law at the time of the violation would have put 
the official on “fair notice” that his conduct violated the 
plaintiff’s rights. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002). In 
other words, the “existing precedent must have placed the 
statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. 
al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011).  
To determine whether a right is clearly established, 
“[w]e look first to applicable Supreme Court precedent” and if 
“none exists, it may be possible that a ‘robust consensus of 
cases of persuasive authority’ in the Court[s] of Appeals could 
clearly establish a right for purposes of qualified 
immunity.”  L.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 836 F.3d 235, 247–48 
(3d Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
A 
We first consider Doerr’s argument that the District 
Court erred in denying him qualified immunity on Starnes’s 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim (Count III). We 
disagree and hold that Starnes stated plausible claims for sex 
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discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The 
District Court did not err in denying Doerr qualified immunity. 
1 
Starnes first alleges that Doerr violated her equal 
protection rights by treating her differently from her male 
colleagues because of her sex. The District Court found 
Starnes’s allegations of sexual harassment “more than 
sufficiently allege[d] severe and pervasive discrimination” 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Starnes I, 2018 WL 
3586835, at *8. It also found Starnes had alleged that Doerr 
denied her field-visit opportunities he gave male officers and 
prevented her from working as a standby probation officer, 
which cost her the “opportunity to acquire overtime and comp 
time.” Starnes II, 2018 WL 4828515, at *2. According to the 
District Court, these facts plausibly stated an equal protection 
claim. Id. (citing Boykins v. Ambridge Area Sch. Dist., 621 
F.2d 75, 80 (3d Cir. 1980)). We agree. 
The Equal Protection Clause proscribes sex-based 
discrimination. Keenan v. City of Philadelphia, 983 F.2d 459, 
465 (3d Cir. 1992). We analyze Starnes’s § 1983 equal 
protection claim using the McDonnell Douglas framework that 
applies in Title VII cases. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 
509 U.S. 502, 506 n. 1 (1993); McKenna v. Pac. Rail Serv., 32 
F.3d 820, 825 n.3 (3d Cir. 1994); see also Lewis v. Univ. of 
Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910, 915 n.5 (3d Cir. 1983) (explaining 
that Title VII and § 1983 share the same elements for 
discrimination purposes).  
Title VII makes it an “unlawful employment practice 
for an employer to . . . discriminate against any individual with 
respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges 
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of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex.” 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a). An employer violates Title VII if the 
employee’s sex was one but-for cause of her disparate 
treatment. Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1739–
40 (2020).  
Starnes alleged she was treated worse than similarly 
situated male probation officers in two ways: quid pro quo 
sexual harassment and the denial of job entitlements. She 
claimed Doerr coerced her into sexual relations, then continued 
to make sexually suggestive gestures toward her and asked her 
to perform sexual acts on herself after their relationship ended.  
Starnes linked Doerr’s sexual advances with her hiring 
and performance as a Butler County Probation Officer. As we 
have stated: 
[U]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for 
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical 
conduct of a sexual nature constitute [quid pro 
quo ] sexual harassment when (1) submission to 
such conduct is made either explicitly or 
implicitly a term or condition of an individual’s 
employment [or] (2) submission to or rejection 
of such conduct by an individual is used as the 
basis for employment decisions affecting such 
individual. 
Bonenberger v. Plymouth Township, 132 F.3d 20, 27 (3d Cir. 
1997) (second and third alterations in original) (quoting 
Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1296 (3d Cir. 
1997), abrogated on unrelated grounds by Burlington N. & 
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006)). 
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A triable claim exists when the plaintiff alleges that she 
would not have been sexually harassed but for her sex. Bostock, 
140 S. Ct. at 1744 (Title VII) (citing Oncale v. Sundowner 
Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (same)). We have 
likewise explained that “[t]he intent to discriminate on the 
basis of sex in cases involving sexual propositions . . . is 
implicit, and thus should be recognized as a matter of course.” 
Moody v. Atl. City Bd. of Educ., 870 F.3d 206, 214 (3d Cir. 
2017) (citation omitted).  
Starnes alleged Doerr forced her to engage in sexual 
relations, shared pornography with her, and requested she send 
him videos of herself performing lewd acts. She accused Doerr 
of flirting with her in an attempt to restart sexual relations. 
Starnes also alleged that their sexual encounters were 
considered a “business relationship,” that Doerr had discussed 
using his position to help her get hired in Butler County before 
coercing her to engage in sexual relations, and that she felt 
compelled to acquiesce to his demands because of his position 
as her boss. And after they stopped having sex, Starnes alleged 
that she was denied many terms and conditions of her 
employment. 
For example, Starnes claimed she was denied her own 
office, overtime opportunities, and the ability to go into the 
field and supervise other probation officers. She alleged that 
her male counterpart could go into the field to supervise his 
probationers, earn overtime, and attend supervisors’ meetings.  
Finally, Starnes claimed she was not on the general email list 
for probation officers and that Doerr assigned two males to 
accompany her on field visits while the male probation officer 
could choose his partner.  
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Accepting these allegations as true, Starnes stated 
plausible claims for sex discrimination in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause because of quid pro quo sexual harassment 
and the denial of benefits afforded to her male counterparts. 
See id. Because the law is clearly established that this conduct 
is actionable discrimination, the District Court did not err in 
denying Doerr qualified immunity. 
2 
We also consider whether the District Court erred in 
denying Doerr qualified immunity on Starnes’s § 1983 hostile 
work environment claim. We hold it did not err. 
Sexual harassment that creates a hostile work 
environment clearly violates Title VII. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB 
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). Under Title VII, a hostile 
work environment exists “when the workplace is permeated 
with ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,’ that is 
‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the 
victim’s employment and create an abusive working 
environment.’” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 
U.S. 101, 116 (2002) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 
U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). The Supreme Court has explained further 
that “conditions” of employment cover not only economic or 
tangible discrimination, but “the entire spectrum of disparate 
treatment of men and women.” Id. (citations omitted).  
To plead a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff 
must allege: “(1) [S]he suffered intentional discrimination . . .; 
(2) the discrimination was severe or pervasive; (3) the 
discrimination detrimentally affected her; (4) it would have 
detrimentally affected a reasonable person in like 
circumstances; and (5) a basis for employer liability is 
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present.” Komis v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 918 F.3d 289, 
293 (3d Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Jensen v. 
Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 449 (3d Cir. 2006), overruled on other 
grounds by Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. 53). 
“[L]ess severe isolated incidents which would not themselves 
rise to the level of [discrimination] may, when taken together 
as part of ‘the overall scenario,’ evidence [discriminatory] 
animus, and one severe incident may be enough to create a 
hostile work environment.” Id. at 293–94. 
Starnes alleged a hostile work environment under those 
standards. She alleges Doerr—her supervisor as the President 
Judge of Butler County—coerced her into engaging in sexual 
relations, shared pornography with her, asked her to film 
herself performing sexual acts, engaged in a pattern of 
flirtatious behavior, scolded her for speaking with male 
colleagues, assigned her duties forcing her to be close to him, 
and treated her differently than her male colleagues. Taken 
together, these allegations support severe or pervasive 
discrimination such that the working environment was 
subjectively and objectively offensive. 
Doerr argues Starnes did not allege a clearly established 
right because we have not previously held that a hostile work 
environment is cognizable under § 1983. But we have been 
clear that § 1983 shares the same elements for discrimination 
purposes as a Title VII action. See Lewis, 725 F.2d at 915 n.5. 
And a robust consensus of persuasive authority exists to clearly 
establish that creating a hostile work environment constitutes a 
§ 1983 violation. See, e.g., Lauderdale v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. 
Just., Inst. Div., 512 F.3d 157, 165–66 (5th Cir. 2007); Huff v. 
Sheahan, 493 F.3d 893, 902 (7th Cir. 2007); Rivera v. P.R. 
Aqueduct & Sewers Auth., 331 F.3d 183, 191–92 (1st Cir. 
2003); Nieto v. Kapoor, 268 F.3d 1208, 1217–20 (10th Cir. 
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2001); Moring v. Ark. Dep’t. of Corr., 243 F.3d 452, 455 (8th 
Cir. 2001); Watkins v. Bowden, 105 F.3d 1344, 1355 n.19 (11th 
Cir. 1997); Jemmott v. Coughlin, 85 F.3d 61, 67 (2d Cir. 1996); 
Beardsley v. Webb, 30 F.3d 524, 529 (4th Cir. 1994); Bator v. 
Hawaii, 39 F.3d 1021, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 1994); Boutros v. 
Canton Reg’l Transit Auth., 997 F.2d 198, 202–04 (6th Cir. 
1993) (overruled on other grounds by Harris, 510 U.S. at 17). 
Because the law is clearly established that the sexual 
harassment Starnes alleged creates a hostile work environment 
actionable under § 1983, the District Court did not err in 
denying Doerr qualified immunity on Count III. 
B 
We turn now to Starnes’s First Amendment claims.  
1 
In Count IV, Starnes claimed Doerr violated her 
freedom of expression and right to petition the government. 
The District Court concluded that Starnes sufficiently pleaded 
this claim and that Doerr was not entitled to qualified 
immunity. We agree. 
Beginning in 2015, Starnes took a variety of actions 
protected by the First Amendment. After her request for on-
call duty in 2015 was rejected, she sent several “Right to 
Know” requests to Butler County seeking information about 
overtime pay for probation officers. She also told her 
supervisors she planned to file a charge of discrimination with 
the EEOC. After telling her supervisors about the complaint in 
February 2016, Doerr and Holman placed her on a 
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“performance improvement plan” in March, even though she 
had received a good evaluation at the end of January. App. 113.  
The law is clearly established that Doerr may not 
retaliate against Starnes for exercising her First Amendment 
rights. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 555 (2007). Official 
retaliation for protected speech “offends the Constitution 
[because] it threatens to inhibit exercise of the protected right.” 
Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006) (alteration in 
original) (citation omitted). A plaintiff claiming retaliation 
must allege “(1) constitutionally protected conduct, (2) 
retaliatory action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary 
firmness from exercising h[er] constitutional rights, and (3) a 
causal link between the constitutionally protected conduct and 
the retaliatory action.” Mirabella v. Villard, 853 F.3d 641, 649 
(3d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). 
 Starnes’s complaint to the EEOC was constitutionally 
protected. See Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 161 (3d Cir. 
1997). “A public employee’s statement is protected activity 
when (1) in making it, the employee spoke as a citizen, (2) the 
statement involved a matter of public concern, and (3) the 
government employer did not have ‘an adequate justification 
for treating the employee differently from any other member 
of the general public.’” Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 
225, 241–42 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 
U.S. 410, 418 (2006)). Starnes’s report of sexual harassment 
and discriminatory conduct by the President Judge falls 
squarely within the protected conduct envisioned by the 
Constitution.  
A public employee speaks as a citizen when she makes 
her statement outside the scope of her official duties. See id. A 
matter is of public concern if it “can be fairly considered as 
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relating to any matter of political, social or other concern to the 
community.” Id. at 242–43 n.25 (citation omitted). When an 
employee exposes malfeasance by a government official, it is 
a matter of public concern. Azzaro v. County of Allegheny, 110 
F.3d 968, 978–79 (3d Cir. 1997). As the District Court 
correctly reasoned, Starnes made her report to the EEOC as a 
citizen and the statement involved a matter of public concern 
because it dealt with sexual malfeasance and an abuse of power 
by a judge. Additionally, Starnes’s EEOC complaint is 
“petitioning activity” because her complaint was not clearly 
frivolous or a sham. See Hill, 455 F.3d at 242 n.24; Anderson, 
125 F.3d at 161. 
Next, we must decide whether Starnes sufficiently 
alleged Doerr retaliated against her as a result of her report to 
the EEOC. Retaliatory action in this § 1983 case is conduct 
“sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from 
exercising h[er] [constitutional] rights.” Rauser v. Horn, 241 
F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001) (second alteration in original) 
(citation omitted). 
Starnes alleged that days after she told her supervisors 
about her complaint, Doerr and Holman placed her on a 
performance improvement plan. Such a plan would have a 
chilling effect on a person of ordinary firmness because she 
could reasonably believe pursuing her constitutional rights 
could jeopardize her employment and prospects for 
advancement. So Starnes alleged retaliatory action in response 
to her protected conduct.  
Finally, Starnes must plead “but-for” causation between 
her constitutionally protected conduct and the retaliation. 
Hartman, 547 U.S. at 256. She must allege “the elements of 
retaliatory animus as the cause of injury, and the defendant will 
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have the . . . opportunity to respond to a prima facie case by 
showing that the action would have been taken anyway, 
independently of any retaliatory animus.” Id. at 260–61. A 
causal link may be established by showing “unusually 
suggestive temporal proximity.” Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. 
DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007).  
Starnes alleged that she told Holman and Doerr about 
her EEOC complaint in February 2016. And they placed her on 
a performance improvement plan within days. This temporal 
proximity between the protected activity and retaliation 
suggests causation. See, e.g., Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 
701, 708 (3d Cir. 1989) (retaliatory conduct two days after an 
EEOC claim showed a causal link). When combined with 
Starnes’s allegation that she had received a positive 
performance review a month before she was put on the 
performance improvement plan, we conclude that the 
allegations, “looked at as a whole, . . . suffice to raise the 
inference” of a causal link. Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys., 
Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 1997).  
In sum, Starnes has pleaded that she spoke as a citizen 
on a matter of public concern and that she suffered retaliation 
as a result of the exercise of her clearly established 
constitutional right. We will therefore affirm the District 
Court’s order denying Doerr’s qualified immunity defense on 
Count IV. 
2 
We turn next to Doerr’s argument that he is entitled to 
qualified immunity on Starnes’s First Amendment association 
claim (Count II). The District Court denied Doerr qualified 
immunity on this claim as well. We disagree and will reverse. 
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Starnes alleged that Doerr “violat[ed] her association 
rights by imposing or seeking to impose an intimate 
relationship on her.” Dkt. No. 34, at 11. Specifically, she 
averred that since she ended their sexual relationship, Doerr 
acted to coerce her into maintaining it, insisting she appear in 
his court so he could “look her over,” transferring her to the 
Juvenile Division so she would “be close to him,” App. 118, 
and scolding her when she spoke to other men at work. App. 
118. Starnes also alleged that Doerr once “ran into [her] and 
her future husband at a Lowe’s store, and remarked that he 
hoped they were off the clock.” App. 72 ¶ 33. And Starnes 
alleged, in conclusory fashion, that she and her future husband 
“were subjected to harassment at the hands of the Court’s 
administration under the direction or acquiescence of Doerr,” 
eventually causing her husband to retire. App. 105 ¶ 34. 
Starnes married her husband despite the harassment.  
Contrary to the claim as pleaded, the District Court 
understood Starnes to allege that Doerr unconstitutionally 
interfered with her relationship with her boyfriend (now 
husband). It held that Doerr’s alleged acts showed sufficient 
interference with that relationship to state an intimate 
association claim. Starnes I, 2018 WL 3586835, at *4–5 (citing 
Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 
435, 441–42 (3d Cir. 2000)). Because this is a civil rights case, 
we must determine whether Starnes is entitled to amend her 
intimate association claim. Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116 
(3d Cir. 2000). So we will address both the claim Starnes 
pleaded and the claim construed by the District Court. 
We begin with the claim as the District Court construed 
it. The right to freedom of association secures “a right to 
associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities 
protected by the First Amendment—speech, assembly, petition 
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for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion.” 
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984). It also 
protects an individual’s right “to enter into and maintain certain 
intimate human relationships,” id. at 617, which is “a 
fundamental element of personal liberty.” Id. at 618. But not 
every intimate relationship is constitutionally protected. See 
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1204 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(discussing factors in determining whether a relationship has 
constitutional protection). The Constitution protects “certain 
kinds of highly personal relationships” with “a substantial 
measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the 
State.” Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618. These relationships include 
“those that attend the creation and sustenance of a family—
marriage, . . . the raising and education of children, . . . and 
cohabitation with one’s relatives.” Id. at 619. In these domains, 
a plaintiff must allege conduct that interferes “directly and 
substantially” with her right to form or maintain that intimate 
relationship. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387 
(1978). 
Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has held that 
unmarried, romantic partners have a fundamental right to 
intimate association. Nor is there a robust consensus of 
persuasive authority recognizing such a right. Compare Poirier 
v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., 558 F.3d 92, 96 (1st Cir. 2009) (“The 
unmarried cohabitation of adults does not fall under any of the 
Supreme Court’s bright-line categories for fundamental rights 
in this area.”)) (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619)), and Cameron 
v. Seitz, 38 F.3d 264, 274–76 (6th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he 
constitutional protection of the right of marital association did 
not clearly extend to a dating relationship or to engagement.”), 
with Matusick v. Erie Cty. Water Auth., 757 F.3d 31, 58 (2d 
Cir. 2014) (betrothed couples are entitled to the same intimate 
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association protections as married couples), and Christensen v. 
County of Boone, 483 F.3d 454, 463 (7th Cir. 2007) (unmarried 
couples receive the same intimate association protections).  
Thus, Doerr is entitled to qualified immunity on the 
claim as construed by the District Court (that Doerr interfered 
with Starnes’s intimate relationship with her husband). Despite 
recognizing a gap in controlling authority, the District Court 
relied on three out-of-jurisdiction opinions to hold that an 
“official’s conduct intending to disrupt a marriage violates the 
First Amendment.” Starnes I, 2018 WL 3586835, at *9 (citing 
Christensen, 483 F.3d at 465; Griffin v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1544, 
1549 (10th Cir. 1993); Gaspers v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs., 
648 F.3d 400, 416 (6th Cir. 2011)).  
The District Court defined the violative conduct too 
broadly for qualified immunity purposes. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 
742 (warning courts not to define clearly established law at “a 
high level of generality”). While the factual circumstances of 
persuasive authority need not be “directly on point for a right 
to be clearly established,” White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 
(2017) (per curiam) (quotations omitted), they must be 
substantially similar enough that “the violative nature of [the] 
particular conduct is clearly established,” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 
742 (emphasis added). Here, a robust consensus of persuasive 
authority must exist to put any reasonable official on notice 
that the particular conduct of harassing a married couple in the 
workplace could violate someone’s association rights. 
The cases cited by the District Court do not suffice to 
put the argument “beyond debate.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. 
For starters, Christensen involves an unmarried couple. 483 
F.3d at 457. Second, in Griffin, the Tenth Circuit considered an 
association claim brought by the subject of a police 
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investigation who complained that a police officer’s lying to 
the subject’s wife cost him his marriage. 983 F.2d at 1548–49 
(holding that although marital association is constitutionally 
protected in general, the facts were not actionable in that case). 
A police officer’s dishonesty is not sufficiently similar to 
harassment in the workplace. Third, in Gaspers, the Sixth 
Circuit considered a case where a wife was allegedly 
terminated from her position as superintendent of a 
correctional facility because of her marriage to a training 
officer at the same facility. 648 F.3d at 403. This is not enough 
to constitute a robust consensus of caselaw to put any 
reasonable official on notice that harassment violates an 
employee’s association rights. See Ullery v. Bradley, 949 F.3d 
1282, 1294–98 (10th Cir. 2020) (finding right clearly 
established with similar reported cases from six sister circuits 
and no cases holding otherwise); Turner v. Lieutenant Driver, 
848 F.3d 678, 687 (5th Cir. 2017) (finding law not clearly 
established with only three sister circuits). 
Even had such a right been clearly established, it would 
be unavailing to Starnes. She alleged that Doerr once “ran into 
[her] and her future husband at a Lowes store, and remarked 
that he hoped they were off the clock.” App. 72 ¶ 33. Apart 
from the fact that Starnes was not married at the time this 
comment was made, this type of off-hand remark is insufficient 
to establish direct and substantial interference with her right to 
establish or maintain that relationship. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. 
at 386–87. In fact, Starnes alleged that she married her husband 
despite the harassment.  
We next consider Starnes’ claim as she pleaded it. 
Starnes provides no support for her allegation that an 
individual can violate another’s association rights by forcing 
them to associate with that individual. So her claim as pleaded 
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does not implicate a right that is clearly established. al-Kidd, 
563 U.S. at 741. Accordingly, Doerr is entitled to qualified 
immunity on Starnes’s pleaded claim. 
Doerr is entitled to qualified immunity on both claims 
of liability because neither the association claim Starnes 
pleaded nor the one the District Court construed alleges a 
violation of a clearly established right. As such, amendment 
would be futile. See Fauver, 213 F.3d at 116; Grayson v. 
Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 111 (3d Cir. 2002). Thus, 
we will reverse the District Court’s denial of qualified 
immunity on Starnes’s intimate association claim. 
* * * 
For the reasons stated, we will affirm in part and reverse 
in part. We will affirm the District Court’s order denying Doerr 
qualified immunity on Starnes’s Fourteenth Amendment equal 
protection claim (Count III) and her First Amendment 
retaliation claim (Count IV). We will reverse the District 
Court’s order denying Doerr qualified immunity on Starnes’s 
First Amendment association claim (Count II). The case will 
be remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
